

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain / Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
4	10	3	8	2

**Comments:** Many of those who disagreed indicated that they held CEDA debaters to a "stricter" standard.

### Question # 14

If the negative team in CEDA debate can persuade me that what they defend is as desirable as the resolution, I am likely to vote negative.

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain / Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
3	18	2	4	1

### Question # 15

If the negative team in CEDA debate can persuade me that what the affirmative defends will violate values more important than those it (the affirmative team) defends, I am likely to vote negative.

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain / Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
13	14	1	0	0

**Comments:** The large majorities in agreement with these two statements suggest that the stock issues of inherency and disadvantages may be part of the judging criteria in CEDA debate.

### Question # 16

The affirmative team in CEDA debate has the burden to show that what they defend achieves certain values rather than just being in harmony with them.

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain / Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
3	8	8	7	2

**Comments:** Many judges who marked "Uncertain" indicated they were unsure of what was meant by "in harmony."

### Question # 17

The negative team in CEDA enjoys presumption on value questions.

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Uncertain / Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
3	7	8	10	0

**Comments:** Many judges who did not agree with this statement indicated they wanted presumption argued by debaters in the round.



## Question # 18

There is very little difference between the way I judge CEDA debate and the way I judge NDT debate.

**Strongly  
Agree**  
1

**Agree**  
5

**Uncertain /  
Neutral**  
5

**Disagree**  
13

**Strongly  
Disagree**  
4

**Comments:** These results are consistant with the responses to the open-ended question (# 7).

### Discussion

The results of this study indicate a number of areas for future research on judging criteria in non-policy debate. The criteria of forensic assistants, the role of NDT judging criteria in CEDA, and the apparent inability of the academic community to influence judging (questions # 10 and # 11) are of particular interest to this writer.

The decision of the people in our activity to debate value propositions and allow theory to emerge from those debates is a noble experiment. However, unless the forensic community accumulates data on what is really happening in this type of academic debate, the experiment may fail for lack of direction.

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<sup>1</sup>Don Brownlee, ed., **Perspectives on Non-Policy Argument** (Cross-Examination Debate Association, 1980).

<sup>2</sup>I am indebted to George Lawson and his students at the University of Nevada at Reno for their cooperation in this study. Also of great assistance were the members of the tabulation staff, particularly Rodney Reynolds and B. Lee Garrison.

<sup>3</sup>This figure is conservative in that it assumes that all non-responding persons judged CEDA debate at the tournament.

<sup>4</sup>The author's M.A. thesis, "The Judging Criteria of C.E.D.A. Debate: Toward the Understanding of One Form of Value Debate," was scheduled for completion during the Winter quarter of 1980-81.

<sup>5</sup>Chi-square greater than .05.



# CEDA VS. NDT THE FACT-VALUE DICHOTOMY EMERGES IN EDUCATIONAL DEBATE

M. Anway Jones

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An instructor of argumentation and debate classes learns that providing students with the basic tools to evaluate rhetorical reasons seems to be the **basic** goal of the authors of argumentation and debate texts. This is seen in one leading text, **Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy** (Ziegelmüller and Dause, 1975). The authors claim:

...to be able to arrive at satisfactory answers to intimate personal problems and to achieve intellectual independence ...to avoid the disruption and suppression of force, and yet be effective in implementing social changes, we must ultimately rely upon the methods of argumentation.<sup>1</sup>

This is generally accepted as a basic philosophy in educational debate, but many in the forensic community would argue that present-day debate style fails to achieve this goal.

Most judges at debate tournaments expect an exercise of reasoned discourse, but often they hear only jargon, unintelligible except possibly to those debaters participating. Discouragement toward this generally accepted debate style, (National Debate Topic), is not uncommon. In fact, it led to the formation of a new debate organization, the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA). In realizing that CEDA seems to have a place in the forensic community (based upon the increase of CEDA debate in tournaments), coaches should be aware of the particular attitudes of both styles of debate and the problems stemming from such attitudes.

Members of CEDA proposed to eliminate the rapid-fire delivery, heavy reliance upon evidence cards, and "squirrel" cases associated with NDT, which they felt were a detriment to achieving the goal of educational debate. Jack Howe, Executive Secretary of CEDA, notes these characteristics of NDT:

The abundance of evidence and the belief that as much of it as possible had to be used during a round, the use of broad national topics that were incapable of limited definition...the rapidity of speech during debates...the use of jargon...that made it all but impossible for the debater to communicate with anyone except his opponents and an "expert" judge...did not seem consistent with the educational objectives that had previously been associated with good debate.<sup>2</sup>



In their attempt to achieve the previously state goal, members of CEDA proposed the use of a value topic in restoring "effective communicative speaking, audience analysis, and a balance among argument, analysis, and evidence to debate."<sup>3</sup>

Reactions to CEDA were heated. Debating propositions of value rather than of policy was absurd—the forensic community had **always** debated policy. Resistance to value propositions is best explained by Ronald Matlon:

Although they are embedded in "ought to" statements, value sub-propositions usually get lost in our persistent effort to debate only propositions of policy.<sup>4</sup>

Determination to debate only propositions of policy is a reflection of tradition; we tend to value or believe only those ideas supported by facts or statistics—scientism. This belief in scientism is noted by Wayne Booth as one of the modern dogmas of rhetoric.<sup>5</sup> The resulting conflict, proposition of policy vs. proposition of value, is a prime example of the fact-value dichotomy that Booth treats in his book, **Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent**.<sup>6</sup> Hugh Petrie discusses the effect of debating value propositions in the forensic community:

The most pernicious of these confusions centers around the fact-value dichotomy. . .because there is a half-truth associated with . . . dichotomy which prompts the following kind of argument: value propositions are neither true nor false. But the subject matter of logic are propositions which can be true or false. . .But further, many propositions in rhetorical argumentation are value propositions. Hence rhetorical argumentation is the wrong subject matter for formal logic.<sup>7</sup>

Petrie further discusses the existence of a strong traditional belief that upholds value judgments equal to factual propositions in stating truths. One contemporary supporter of this view is Joseph Wenzel, who realizes the definite fact-value dichotomy. In his attempt toward achieving a "rhetoric of assent,"<sup>8</sup> (Booth's term), he declares that it is an error,

. . .to seek to justify values on the same epistemological basis on which we justify factual statements, or. . .to suppose, because value statements cannot be justified in the same manner as factual statements, that they are in some ways epistemologically inferior. . .the fact of human community, of duty, of the recognition of mutual obligation is what gives significance to the class of value statements that we call ethical.<sup>9</sup>

Further, in emphasizing the importance of value statements, Wenzel acknowledges,



values exist in an intersubjective realm of agreements that are the fabric of a community; they exist in the actions of discourse of persons constructing, sustaining, testing, and revising the rules by which they will live and act together.<sup>10</sup>

Many would disagree with Wenzel's claim that value statements are as important as those of fact and would consider the idea of debating value propositions absurd. One critic is Charles Stevens, who believes,

...to the extent that a value dispute is based upon difference in belief about the facts, it can be resolved logically; to the extent that such a dispute involves disagreement in attitudes, i.e., evaluations, it cannot be resolved rationally, and one merely has recourse to "persuasion". . .<sup>11</sup>

Of course there are other opposing views such as those offered by Thomas Kane and Bernard Brock, who argue on different terms: "...all of our theories of argument must be explicitly formulated before we allow our students to experiment with them."<sup>12</sup> As Matlon points out, though, both Kane and Brock deny reality on two counts: 1. judgements on values are made every day, and 2. many times practice comes before theory.<sup>13</sup> Also, there is the argument that the debate format would have to be changed in terms of speaker duties, construction of speeches, and the like.<sup>14</sup> The latter two arguments against value propositions are minor, and the major discrepancy concerns the fact-value dichotomy, but it is important to reveal rationalizations to oppose the introduction of value propositions.

As to the fact-value dichotomy in educational debate, the first exposure to CEDA debate style often is confusing or even appalling. The rejection of this particular style may result from prevalent attitudes of judges. Initial arguments against CEDA in selecting value propositions were not that value propositions had to have rules clearly defined, but that it was senseless to argue attitudes. Above all, many felt uneasy in giving a win or loss decision. There were other objections to CEDA, particularly toward the student's absence of evidence, and also the absence of judging criteria of value topics.

A great many writers favor value propositions. Matlon's reasons for debating value propositions include the following: 1. Coaches and debaters would contribute to the understanding of value theory, and 2. Debaters would be subject to an explanation of the logic behind the value hierarchies used.<sup>15</sup> He further states that "debating propositions of value thereby would force debaters to understand and argue value premises as they apply to audience acceptance of those premises."<sup>16</sup> Another opinion in support of value propositions suggest that "...logic is clearly conceived today as broad enough to include arguments with value premises. . .if there is a value premise, there seems to be no reason why one cannot have a value conclusion."<sup>17</sup>

After evaluating the reasons given in support of value propositions with those against, some issues surface. It seems that the majority of those not in favor of value judgements feel that no one can tie a value to a reason nor a reason to a value. They see values unequal to reasons in terms of validity.



Those critics deny that Malton, Petrie, and Wenzel have expressed—value statements are "closely intertwined with statements of fact and attitudes about policies. . . even though claims made about the phenomena may be subject to dispute."<sup>18</sup> In essence, they deny practically any judgement made in policy propositions, for, as Malton points out, any decision we make is based upon our value system. For example, consider a case in which the negative opposes the affirmative on the grounds of attitudinal inherency, such as prohibition. If this particular negative team were to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such a position held by the affirmative team was not effective in the past (we did accept the policy at one time, but our value system has changed) nor, based on factual and opinion evidence, would be effective in the future because of an attitudinal barrier, judges should give the win to the negative on a workability issue. In other words, the negative would have proven that the attitudes of the people would be such that this particular policy would not and could not be effective. Thus, it is illustrated, perhaps minimally in an "isolated case," that we cannot escape value judgements in any type of decision-making process.

Relative to the fact-value dichotomy is the use of evidence in each style of debate. With NDT there exists a "prostitution" of evidence and with CEDA there is an "abortion" of evidence. The reasons for both cases are understood, yet harmful to fulfilling the goal of educational debate. The absence of evidence in CEDA can be attributed to the organization's protest toward NDT. Feeling that NDT debaters had gone to the extreme in using evidence cards in "proving" arguments never established other than through reading cards, and also feeling perhaps that "facts" had no real connection to values, debaters of CEDA went to the other extreme. They appeared to oppose any type of evidence (factual or opinion) in trying to develop strong lines of reasoning. As to why NDT debaters put so much emphasis on the use of evidence cards, a study by James Benson provides some answers. He attributes the goals of the American Forensic Association as a major reason for the use of cards. He states,

A frequently mentioned objective is that of teaching students to use evidence according to prescribed standards, including use of best available evidence, careful documentation of evidence, and accuracy in the use of evidence.<sup>19</sup>

Debate coaches should not encourage students to take this objective to the extreme as is currently done. By so doing, coaches overlook the possibility that students may see the use of reading cards as the essence of an argument rather than the support of the argument. (So many times judges comment on the ballot that just reading card after card does not establish an argument, but merely supports a point.) Just reading cards cannot have any application to the case in point unless some explanation or clarification is given. Why, then, do NDT debaters use so many pieces of evidence? The practice may stem from encouragement both by coaches and fellow debaters, observation of other debaters, and also from the basic indoctrination of scientism. Benson states in his study that even when debaters thought they were stressing quality of evidence they were only stressing the quantity.<sup>20</sup>



Not only do NDT debaters over-utilize the abundance of evidence available to them, they also do not conform to the AFA's goal of utilizing factual rather than opinion evidence. Benson notes the problem:

Generally. . .the debater's use of evidence does not conform to. . .usual textbook standards: a preference for factual, rather than opinion evidence.<sup>21</sup>

As indicated by Benson, most debaters do not conform to using factual evidence as preferred (a scientific approach) but instead use opinion as first choice, followed by the use of factual evidence. However, it is believed that opinion evidence is better than factual.<sup>22</sup> If this be the case, what reasons do members of CEDA give in opposition to the strong use of evidence, other than the philosophy that the use inhibits the development of arguments? (The argument that facts cannot be intertwined with values should no longer be an issue.)

Opposition toward CEDA of late is if not against the use of value propositions, but rather toward the absence of evidence. CEDA appears to require little research. It is as though the debaters strictly "think off the top of their heads." Many of them are afraid of using any form of evidence cards for fear that the more use would not conform to the guidelines of debating value propositions, and also, because of the great opposition toward NDT. However, a student of persuasion knows that support is needed to express ideas, especially in the area of argumentation and debate. Not only does support add to the line of reasoning, but also to the credibility of the speaker. It is not suggested that it is necessary to doubt what is presented to the extent that fact upon fact must be reported, but rather, provide evidence to give clarity, insight, and support to the case in point. In this point of view, evidence can be considered as facts, statistics, **and** value judgments.

If a judge were to accept evidence as such, anything in support of a proposition (good reasons), he should have no trouble in judging **any** type of proposition. For example, in giving an evaluation in a value topic debate round, a judge can use the criteria derived by Walter Fisher. According to Fisher, values can be identified and assessed on the same principles that we identify and assess facts.<sup>23</sup> (Of course, with values it is suggested that value hierarchies be used as guidelines in giving evaluations.) The argument still may arise concerning the outcome of the debate on value propositions. In debating value propositions judges are not deciding which value is better, as in NDT (plan vs. plan), but rather, as Wenzel suggests, they decide as follows:

The question then becomes not which rule is better, for both may be perfectly sound rules, but rather which course of action is likely to produce the least harm in this specific situation. One thus proceeds to weigh the consequences of particular acts in order to reach decision to the given situation.<sup>24</sup>

Debating value propositions is an alternative to debating the traditional policy topics. However, coaches and debaters should consider value propositions equal in importance to policy propositions; and also, they should consider all the possible ways to evaluate value judgments. The birth of value



propositions in the forensic community may be a move toward eliminating the fact-value dichotomy; thus an attempt to achieve the rhetoric of assent.

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## FORENSICS RESEARCH IN THE 1980s

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Periodic self-appraisals are useful in many enterprises, and the opening of a new decade is a traditional time for such reflection. Lately, I have been thinking about the academic status of forensics—not from the viewpoint of the student participants, but from the perspective of the faculty who are involved. For the faculty, the academic status of forensics (by which I mean respect from departments, deans, non-forensic professional organizations and other elements of the academic community) is an essential component in one's self-respect, professional standing and prospects for strong program support.

For reasons which are complex, debatable, and beyond the scope of this essay, academic status is very strongly influenced by the amount and quality of professional research associated with a discipline or specialty. Though a



coach's teams are probably the main component of ethos for another coach meeting him/her for the first time, it is the coach's list of publications which determines the warmth of his or her acceptance into the inner realms of non-forensic communities, like a university or the Speech Communication Association. In a similar way, whole specialties (forensics is one) meet with different levels of approbation according to how they are represented in print. Which of us does not have very different impressions of rhetoric, communicology or organizational communication because of the type of material which we associate with them? In this essay, I will express my own perceptions of what our current status is, what research possibilities seem more profitable for the next decade, and finally, what role our professional organizations should take vis-a-vis forensics research.<sup>1</sup>

### **The Current State of Forensics Research**

To begin, we should distinguish between two different types of research produced by forensics professionals. The first is practical advice to debaters, interpreters and coaches. At its best, this work describes the sociology or psychology of our community; at its worst, it consists of a series of prescriptions. This practical research is interesting and helpful, but only to us. It has small relevance to anyone uninterested in our competitions. Accordingly, this work adds little to our academic status: it only returns internal benefits to us. I don't mean to suggest that such work be halted; every specialty must attend to the nuts and bolts of its own structure. But I do mean to say that the external agencies who may form impressions of our quality are probably not interested in how to power match or in what makes a good extemp topic. Essays (like this one, for instance) which focus largely on ourselves might conceivably be seen as a professional service, rather than as professional research. We have always had a large amount of this practical research, and it has been of consistently good quality. Credit for this should probably be given to the editors and sponsoring organizations of journals like **The Forensic, Speaker and Gavel** and **Debate Issues**, which tend to carry this first kind of work; textbook authors and publishers have also made valuable contributions.

In the long term, however, our status will probably be determined by the second kind of research—theoretical. Nor surprisingly, our theoretical work has more scope than our practical efforts. The Sedalia conference defined forensics an "an educational activity primarily concerned with using an argumentative perspective in examining problems and communicating with people."<sup>2</sup> Research focusing not on the educational activity, but rather on the argumentative perspective, is that which moves in a theoretical direction. Argumentation is a fundamental aspect of virtually all human communication. The study of argument admits us into boardrooms, bedrooms, clinics and cliques. By studying argument, we adjoin all the humanities and social sciences, and so make contributions to studies of great scope. Perhaps the single most encouraging thing about current forensics research is its greater (or at least more apparent) awareness of argumentation's importance to the study of people.

Argumentation is a recent phenomenon, when viewed as part of the modern history of the speech communication profession. Some articles on argument have always appeared in our national journals, but argumentation was only an occasional concern during the time when modern attention was



swinging toward interpersonal communication and away from rhetoric and criticism. Not surprisingly, therefore, we are below par methodologically. Our empirical studies tend to be observational rather than experimental, post hoc rather than planned, univariate or bivariate rather than multivariate. For the most part, we seem to prefer theoretical speculation to rigorous empirical testing. Of course, every specialty needs theory and simple studies, but my point is that we seem to have too much of them and too little of advanced methodology, when we are compared to more mature specialties like interpersonal communication.

But these failings are expectable, given our relative youth as a modern theoretical specialty. It is more reasonable to look at our recent trends in methodology in order to assess our prospects for the 1980s. Recent movement is encouraging. Even casual browsing through the last decade's issues of **Journal of the American Forensic Association** shows increasing attention to theory rather than practice, increasing use of empirical methodologies to test hypotheses, increasing sophistication in the statistics used, and increasing complexity in the theories discussed (e.g., constructivism and cognitive theories). Similar impressions arise from inspection of convention programs presented at the annual dual meeting of the American Forensic Association and the SCA. Within our own organization, the final years of the 1970s saw a rise in attention to research, both in the orientation of **The Forensic** and in Pi Kappa Delta's national committee structure.

If these trends continue, argumentation will mature considerably in the coming decade. Promising graduate students are being drawn to the study of argument at major universities, rather than being discouraged from "writing on debate," as was the case only a few years ago. As these new professionals produce more high-quality theoretical research, argumentation will become a more legitimate area of study.

### Specific Research Possibilities

All this talk of status and trends has been fairly general in tone. In this section, I will try to be more specific in identifying profitable-looking lines of current research and in asking some questions I think our researchers may want to answer. However, my purpose is only to illustrate, and so I won't try to give thorough reviews of this work.

My first concern here is to mention some fertile extant work. Pertinent literature is to be found within the specialty of argumentation, within the field of communication generally, and in other scholarly disciplines as well.

An extremely encouraging trend within our specialty has been the emergence of several **programs** of research. The great advantage of a research program, in contrast to a single study, is that a program develops in idea, elaborates it, limits it, and cumulates information about it. Students and scholars get a satisfying sense of coherence and growth from a program of studies, whereas they may be frustrated in trying to integrate the results of a single study into their general understandings of argument. Let me list several recent programs which seem likely to continue: Clark and Delia's work on how children learn to adapt arguments to their audiences;<sup>3</sup> Willard's use of constructivism and symbolic interactionism to form a theory of argument;<sup>4</sup> McKerrow's continuing analysis of rhetorical validity;<sup>5</sup> Jackson and Jacob's studies of conversations and how they move toward understandings



and claims;<sup>6</sup> and my own attempts to build a cognitive model of argument.<sup>7</sup> All of these programs are recent (at least within our own specialty), all are unfinished and all give promise of advancing our understanding of argument between humans. These efforts will almost certainly continue, at least into the early part of the next decade.

Looking inside our specialty, but still within the field of speech communication, argumentation seems to have a great deal of unexplored potential for linking up with other specialties. For instance, one way to view argument is to see it is a type of interpersonal encounter.<sup>8</sup> Argumentation theorists are beginning to wonder, "What is it like to be **in** an argument? and "How do two people **have** an argument?" The answers to these and similar questions require a prior understanding of interpersonal communication, and so we will soon have to make bridges into the interpersonal research. Conflict management is emerging as a strong interest in the field; argument scholars should certainly be involved in this work. A frequent concern is intercultural communication is how to detect and deal with differences in value orientations; where could we find a better opportunity to study value argument? I think it almost inevitable that the 1980s will see more contact between our specialty and the others within the discipline. We should encourage this development, since it proceeds from the assumption that argumentation is a central aspect of human relations.

From other fields there is so much we might borrow and repay that I hardly know where to begin. Several areas of psychology have already been useful. Cognitive psychology can help us understand intrapersonal arguing—how a person thinks, where reasons come from. Developmental psychology bares some processes in argument, and displays the maturation of argumentation ability. We have a long tradition of using material from philosophy, history and literature for our theories or data. It is not hard to conjure possible relations between argumentation and nearly any other discipline, from electrical engineering on one hand (for cybernetics and information theory), to art or dance on the other (to study from or nonverbal communication). Certainly we will continue to use the literature of other disciplines. Interestingly, most of the research programs I listed earlier seem to have their roots in other disciplines.

Regardless of what literature we draw on, I think we will (or at least should) deeply involve ourselves in answering two questions which we've barely asked in recent years. The first of these is, "How do we **invent** arguments?" In spite of the fact that argumentation is classically studied within the canon of invention, we know little about the way arguments are created. Why one argument instead of another? What suggested a particular argument? Are some argument forms easier to generate than others? What counts psychologically as evidence, and where does it come from? I think we should be much further along in our study of invention and creativity if we are soon to claim a mature understanding of arguments.

A second interesting question is, "How do we **process** arguments?" That is, what makes discourse an argument in the mind of a receiver? How does a person get from evidence to claim in testing someone else's message? How much influence does the message have, in comparison to memories and pre-existing beliefs? Is there a difference between arguing and thinking?

I recognize that both of these questions spring from my own (perhaps idiosyncratic) view of argument. Other writers might nominate some other



issues: "How does arguing differ from other interpersonal episodes?" "Does the setting—interpersonal, organizational, mass, etc.—affect the nature of conduct of argument?" "How does argument manifest itself in discourse?" The seeds of all these concerns can be found in recent years' research or theory; the next decade will no doubt see at least a little harvesting. We probably can't build an empirical science of argument in only ten years, but our increasing sophistication in theory and methodology suggests we can start in earnest.

### Conclusions

In closing this paper, it seems appropriate to comment on the role our forensic organizations should play in encouraging theoretical research, and thereby assuring a higher academic status for our specialty.

First of all, we must recognize and deal with certain institutional threats. Our forensics programs are expensive. Financial pressures on states and schools are causing programs to be cut back or eliminated. Nearly all the coaches reading this essay, and most of the students, can list several once healthy program which have been dropped or which are struggling along with tiny squads. If you host a tournament, has it gotten larger or small during the 1970s? As financial support for programs declines, they become less attractive to students and faculty. Virtually all the faculty in our specialty were once student participants; if we begin to have fewer undergraduates in forensics, the long range implications are ominous. Somehow our national organizations must help us resist financial pressures—we must do a better job of justifying our programs and must run them more efficiently.

A second class of threats is internal schisms. I am worried by two possibilities here. First, coaches and researchers tend to be different people. Not a single author of the research programs I mentioned earlier is still an active coach. There are a few exceptions, of course, but generally coaching demands so much time that faculty must eventually choose between coaching and researching. Since this choice seems inherent to many colleges today, we can probably do little about it. What we must guard against is the emergence of a two-class system: coaches=members, and researchers=leaders. Strong pressures for a two-class system exist—coaches have little time for the minutiae of national offices—and may result in resentment by the coaches. We must make a conscious effort to get active coaches into important national and regional organizations. A second possible schism is between debate and individual events. Both activities have always come under the umbrella term forensics, but it has often been an uneasy alliance. In some schools, debate is sponsored in the speech department, but oral interpretation is taught in the theater department. Our organizations must respect the differences between debate and individual events, but should try to provide common ground and an integrated leadership. PKD does a good job of this, but some other organizations—the AFA, for instance—might be criticized on these grounds.

Having sounded these warnings, let me close on a positive note by mentioning some of the helpful things we can and have done to facilitate research. PKD has formed a research subcommittee to encourage and monitor forensics research. **The Forensic** is now announcing research themes and soliciting research reports. Our national convention will soon