

The Forensic

of Pi Kappa Delta

A Note from the Editor: Remembering Bob Derryberry, Five Years Later

JOSH COMPTON, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

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Book Review: Schroeder's *Presidential Debates: Fifty Years of High-Risk TV*

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The *Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta* invites authors to submit manuscripts related to scholarship, pedagogy, research and administration in competitive and non-competitive speech and debate activities. *The Forensic* welcomes submissions from forensic coaches, communication/rhetoric scholars, and students (undergraduate and graduate).

The Editor and Editorial Board invite scholarly discussion of making competitive individual events and debate powerful tools for teaching essential citizenship practices, including clear and ethical communication. Topics of particular interest to the Editor and Editorial Board include, but are not limited to: ways to increase diversity in forensics, speech/argumentation pedagogy, and transfer as it relates to forensics (e.g., transfer among individual events, debate, and interpretation; transfer between competition and the classroom, and vice versa; transfer between forensics and careers).

The journal seeks submissions reflecting perspectives from all current debate and individual event forms, including, but not limited to: NDT, CEDA, NEDA, NPDA, IPDA, Lincoln-Douglas Debate, as well as NIET, NFA and non-traditional individual events. The journal also welcomes explorations of non-competitive speech and debate activities, including classroom projects, interdisciplinary efforts, and civic programs. *The Forensic* may also publish reviews of books, activities, and other educational materials. Potential authors should contact the Editor regarding the choice of material for review.

All submitted works must be original, unpublished, and not under review by other publishers. Any research involving human subjects must have the approval of the author's institutional review board. Submissions should conform to APA guidelines (latest edition). E-mail submissions to the editor in Word format with no specialized internal formatting. Manuscripts should not exceed 25 double-spaced typed pages, exclusive of tables and references. The title page should include the title, author(s), correspondence address, e-mail address and telephone number of the author(s). The second page should include an abstract of between 75 and 100 words. The text of the manuscript (including its title) should begin on the next page, with no reference to the author, and with the remaining pages numbered consecutively. Avoid self-identification in the text of the manuscript. Notes and references should be typed and double-spaced on the pages following the text of the manuscript. Tables should be clearly marked regarding their placement in the manuscript.

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THE FORENSIC OF PI KAPPA DELTA (ISSN:0015-735X) is published twice yearly, Winter and Summer, by Pi Kappa Delta Fraternal Society. Subscription price is part of membership dues. For alumni and non-members the rate is \$20.00 for 1 year, \$40.00 for 2 years, and \$60.00 for 3 years. Second class postage is paid at Ripon, WI. Postmaster and subscribers: Please send all address change requests to: PKD, 125 Watson St., P. O. Box 38, Ripon, WI 54971. **THE FORENSIC** is also available on 16 mm microfilm, 35 mm microfilm, or 100 mm microfilm from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Rd, Ann Arbor, MI 48106.

Correction

Correction: The lead author of the article, "Putting the Gender in 'Gender Parity': Breaking New Methodological Ground in the Debate over Gender Equity in Forensics," *The Forensic*, Summer 2014, is Jessica Furgerson of Western Kentucky University. The cover and table of contents incorrectly identified her as "Jennifer." The editor regrets his error.

Missing

A Note From the Editor: Remembering Bob Derryberry, Five Years Later

The calendar doesn't lie, I have heard it said, and yet, I'm pretty sure that it stretches the truth. My calendar tells me that it has been five years since Bob Derryberry died—a legendary forensic coach, a PKD Hall of Fame member, my friend and mentor.

I just can't believe five years have passed. Wasn't it yesterday that I opened a handwritten note of encouragement from him, pausing between classes to smile at his familiar handwriting, to hear his distinctive voice through his pen? Didn't Bob and I talk on the phone just this morning about gardens and books and time?

But in other ways, yes, I feel the weight of those five years. Of course it's been that long. Bob never met my firstborn, Henry, who is walking (running) and talking now. Bob didn't attend PKD's Centennial. I wasn't able to tell Bob that we finally gave up on growing a decent garden in our shaded backyard here in Vermont and, instead, we frequent farmers' markets for our tomatoes, peppers, and okra.

Okra. That's what I was planting when I first penned a remembrance of Bob, a few weeks after his death. I remember that well, because Bob used to plant okra in his backyard, under an oak tree, and he liked it best when his wife, Joyce, would fry it in bacon grease, a special treat.

My okra that year, five years ago, didn't do very well. Later that season, the seeds produced a single pod. I couldn't bear to eat it—it looked pitiful, and it didn't seem worth the trouble of greasing up a cast iron pan for a single bite. So I saved that okra pod in a plastic bag, tucked it away on a shelf in our mudroom, behind a row of books that were well suited for back porch reading.

And then years passed. (The calendar doesn't lie.) I forgot about that okra, we gave up on growing a garden, and on we went.

Until last spring, when I found the dried pod, nearly five years old. I cracked open the brittle covering, removed two or three seeds, and planted them. And then I waited.

I watched that pot of dirt for days, thinking it would be just right for the okra to grow again, for me to be able to keep planting okra from that seed planted long ago, only a few weeks after Bob's death. Some people plant a memorial tree; I had planted a memorial okra.

The okra didn't grow, though. No matter where I moved that pot for better summer sun, no matter how many times I watered it, or when, or how much—no okra. But something else did grow. A yellow flower sprouted from that pot. I don't know what kind of flower it was, only that it was yellow, and a flower, and pretty. And not okra.

I was disappointed, but not for long. Because the only reason this flower grew was because of what I learned from Bob. I wouldn't have been watching that spot if not for him. And while Bob's tradition was

his, my tradition will end up being something else.

And for that, and for so many other things you taught me, Bob, I am grateful, and you are missed, very much.

Josh Compton
Editor, *The Forensic*



Aristotle and Impromptu: Lessons for Impromptu Speech Structure(s) from Aristotle's Theory of Rhetorical Proof

THOMAS DUKE, THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

Abstract: *Most competitors in impromptu employ a speech structure that is deductive and argument centered. Moreover, speeches that employ an example-based pattern are often regarded as less sophisticated. But in his Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that speeches can be based on either arguments or examples, depending on the situation. In this paper, I analyze the dominant structure based on 'unified analysis,' assess its weaknesses and conclude by developing a new, inductive, example-based speech structure founded on Aristotle's theory of proof. Further implications for the event based on Aristotle's theory of proof are also presented.*

Compared to other events, there is presently a dearth of scholarly inquiry into impromptu speaking as a forensic event. A similar complaint was made by Bytwerk (1985), but just five years later, Preston (1990) and Williams, Carver and Hart (1993) were able to claim that the late 1980s had been an extremely productive era for scholarship on impromptu. But it is no longer the case that impromptu is frequently the subject of research, as even a brief review of the forensic journals will indicate. The reasons behind this phenomenon are unclear, but one reason may be illustrated by a now familiar fable attributed to a rhetor from ancient Greece. Aesop, a story teller and public speaker, purportedly wrote of a conversation between the moon and her mother. In the conversation, the moon asks for a dress and her mother declines to make one, for, as the moon was constantly changing, it would be impossible to make one to fit her (Aesop, trans. 1912, XVI). Aesop's fable has lessons for impromptu. Scholars seeking to develop new theories of impromptu must adapt them to describe an event that is constantly changing, an event that is in many ways never the same (Turnipseed, 2005). Of course, there are things that are constant about impromptu (the time limits, the setting, and the kind of prompt) but these constants do not negate the fact that at the level of invention, one speech is almost never identical to the other. In what follows, I seek to identify two interlinked constants in impromptu related to organization and mode of proof. Following a brief discussion of prior research on impromptu speaking, I analyze portions of Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric* related to invention and arrangement. Subsequently, I discuss the relationship between

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Aristotle's theories and the practice of impromptu speaking, developing implications and coaching strategies.

Discussion of Prior Research

As I noted at the beginning of this essay, research on impromptu is comparatively scarce. Much of the research is also somewhat dated. Two conceptual areas of research, nevertheless, have substantially contributed to our understanding of the event that relate to the argument I am making here. Substantial research has been conducted on memory, invention and arrangement, while other researchers have contributed indirectly to the study of these three rhetorical canons. In what follows, I describe the research conducted on invention and memory, the research conducted on arrangement, highlight the connections between that research and the practice of impromptu and explain the problem that my essay seeks to answer.

The first area of influential research into impromptu has focused on the relationship between invention and memory. Building on Quintillian's concept of *copia*, Dean (1987) argues that impromptu as an event requires mastery of the canon of memory; it requires the speaker to develop a reservoir of examples and arguments that are familiar and can be quickly and easily deployed. Building on this research, Bury (1999) argues that memory is the essential element of success in impromptu speaking. Specifically, she argues for the creation of a commonplace book (more commonly known as an impromptu notebook) to help the student remember previously developed examples. She goes on to suggest that our memory is metaphorical, that we call up memories and indeed examples by remembering things that are alike, that are stored next to each other in our mental filing cabinets (Bury, 1999).

This research complements work carried out by Boone (1987) who argues that students should think metaphorically when coming up with examples. That is, students should search for examples that are related indirectly, by analogy, to the main subject of the impromptu speech. The student should, she argues, develop an impromptu notebook with several main subject areas with examples that can be metaphorically related to the topic. She refers to the process of generating examples in this way as thinking laterally, or thinking in terms of how examples are directly related to each other by analogy. This is differentiated from thinking vertically, which involves thinking in terms of the prompt and how to prove that the argument it makes is true or untrue (Boone, 1987). It is not a substantial stretch to say that thinking laterally is an inductive process of generating examples that substantiate arguments and thinking vertically is a deductive process that generates arguments to prove the speaker's points. Although Boone does suggest that the examples and arguments generated should be appropriate to the topic, she gives no clear distinction between appropriate and inappropriate examples. As evidence that Boone's metaphorical thinking caught on, one has only to read Preston (1990),

who writing three years later, more or less declared “metaphorical analysis” to be the essence of impromptu speaking that distinguishes it from extemporaneous speaking.

The second area of research into impromptu has focused on the arrangement of the speech. Those intimately familiar with the activity will be aware that the dominant mode of organizing the speech centers on the use of an introduction with an example, the quotation, interpretation and preview. The body contains two arguments with two examples each and a conclusion that is the inverse of the introduction. This pattern has clearly developed as an extension of Carroll’s (1998) “unified analysis” and is described in detail and recommended for use in the work of Turnipseed (2005) and Billings and Billings (2000). While certainly not all speakers use this pattern, it is very common at competitive regional and national tournaments. Although it does contain concrete examples (Billings and Billings 2000), this pattern centers the speech on arguments that support an interpretation. It is in the words of Carroll (1998) “a more sophisticated [form] of analysis” than “argument-by-example” (p. 13-14). This approach is clearly a development over previous research which had tended to emphasize that the structure of an impromptu speech ought to suit the subject of the speech (Reynolds and Fay, 1987). Indeed, Compton (2005) acknowledges that such a structure exists, arguing that, in practice, competitors have “develop[ed] a pattern... not of reciting the same content, i.e. the ‘canned’ speech but for analyzing the statement and then forming the speech” (p. 3).

Whether the research caused the event to evolve or simply documented existing trends is unimportant. What is clear in any case is that the event has evolved into a kind of lite literary criticism of sentences as a familiar pattern for analyzing and organizing the speech has emerged, collapsing the stages of invention, memory and arrangement. Billings and Billings (2000) suggest the use of unified analysis as a pattern of arrangement (which affects invention) because of the time constraints. Furthermore, as Compton (2005) also implies, because of time constraints, the process of generating examples and arguments, of preparing the impromptu speech, is likely to be a process that involves peripheral processing of information as opposed to central processing. All of this research might lead one to the conclusion that as an event, impromptu is argument lite. Indeed, Bury (1999) points out that the nature of the event often leads judges to focus primarily on issues of style and delivery rather than arrangement, memory or invention.

Because invention, memory and arrangement have all become collapsed together, due to the time constraints, arrangement and memory have become the dominant means of creating a speech. While invention is certainly at work, much of it has actually occurred before the round has begun both through the condensation of memory into an impromptu notebook and knowledge of the pattern suggested by unified analysis. Although the process of arrangement has been exam-

ined by Carroll (1998), his treatment and its widespread acceptance has given rise to competitors avoiding organizational patterns based around examples. Invention itself, considered apart from arrangement and memory, seems not to have been examined very much all. Reynolds and Fay (1987) argue that “the ideal impromptu speaker... [is] able to use a variety of proofs and arguments” (p. 87). But what kind of “proofs and arguments” are impromptu speakers supposed to master, what kind of organization are they to use?

This essay aims to both add to the research which has already been done on invention and to propose a new method of organizing impromptu speeches. Thus I ask two questions: 1) According to Aristotle’s theory of proof, how should impromptu speeches be organized?; and, 2) What kinds of examples does Aristotle suggest are appropriate in his theory of proof? The latter question represents an extension of my study to examine the impact of arrangement and the use of metaphorical topoi on the invention of examples.

Aristotle’s Conclusions

As suggested, rather than looking to Aristotle’s theory of arrangement, this study examines his theory of proof as it relates to invention. This approach is not unprecedented; Gage (1983) argues that Aristotle’s theory of proof can be used as “an invention strategy leading to the control of structural choices” (p. 38). Aristotle’s theory of proof describes the elements of a speech necessary to prove a point to the audience, arguing that there are two means of doing so. One can prove a point by the use of enthymemes or by the use of paradigms. There are other methods, but they are merely variants on the use of enthymemes and paradigms. Among the many reasons why Aristotle’s *The Art of Rhetoric* ought to be placed in conversation with impromptu practices is that (as I will demonstrate), the event already adheres to Aristotelian norms, namely, his suggestion that speeches be structured around arguments (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.20.9). But more importantly, Aristotle’s theory of proof is imbricated in a wider theory of rhetoric, of which we have a comprehensive theoretical description—a comprehensive description that is not always present in other theorists both ancient and modern. Moreover, because Aristotle’s rhetorical system is concerned with both theory and practice, it is possible to make connections between the two that might otherwise be difficult to make were the study grounded in the work of another author.

For purposes of clarity, I refer to the enthymeme as an argument and the paradigm as an example. I am distinctly aware that in using this terminology, I am simplifying a complex translation issue. While the paradigm has long been translated as “example,” there is not a similar English word for “enthymeme.” But I justify this translation on the following grounds. First, the enthymeme is the type of argument most used in forensics (only in policy debate does one find Aristotle’s other type of argument, the syllogism). As Grimaldi (1957)

points out, the enthymeme is a method of “constructing probable argumentation” (p. 190). Second, and perhaps most importantly, most coaches (and forensic scholars) speak of “arguments” and “examples” when discussing impromptu. Thus, it is critically important to speak in terms familiar to those who participate in, coach and write about the event; even if one sacrifices a small amount of precision in so doing. Returning to Aristotle’s theory of proof, there are two relevant points that we should closely consider. The first regards how he suggests that the examples and arguments should be organized and the second pertains to his understanding of what kinds of arguments and examples are appropriate.

First, Aristotle predictably favors a deductive or argument-based pattern of arranging a speech. That is, Aristotle suggests that arguments should be placed first and that examples should follow them (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.20.9). (This is exemplified by the traditional structure of impromptu in which the speaker begins with an interpretation or thesis and goes on to prove it to be valid by grounding it in additional arguments and examples). Aristotle argues, moreover, that enthymematic arguments should not spell out all of the steps in their logic. The rhetor should instead consider what the audience already knows in order not to be redundant or to waste words expounding upon the obvious. Additionally, long strings of argumentation should not be used because chains of arguments have the potential to confuse audience members. Even though he clearly prefers a deductive kind of organization that places the arguments first and the examples second, Aristotle claims that there are occasions when examples should be placed first or when they should become the exclusive form of proof utilized in a speech. It is not immediately clear when he would suggest the use of inductive, example-based reasoning, but the concern demonstrated in the *Art of Rhetoric* for how the audience will perceive a message may give us some hints. He suggest that there might be moments when we do not have arguments or when there might be arguments that an audience would find distasteful if they were made openly (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.20.5-9). In these cases, an example has the potential to lead the audience toward accepting an argument before they are aware that the argument is being made. This inductive style is more conducive to a rhetorical approach that is designed to teach the audience, as Aristotle acknowledges, stating that the awareness of examples is the origin or starting point of knowledge (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.20.2).

Second, as part of his discussion of the proper usage of the enthymeme, Aristotle suggests that arguments and examples should be closely linked to the subject being presented. Of arguments, he writes: “I should like to know...how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not if we do not know” the nature of the situation (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.22.5-6). As if this were not clear enough, he later says, that speakers should:

not derive their arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from what is inherent in each particular subject... [and that] ...

we must look...at whatever is inherent in the subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many facts as possible, particularly those intimately connected with the subject...the more closely connected they are with the subject, the more suitable. (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.22.10)

He writes similarly of the example, anticipating the use of examples that are only analogously related to the subject. Writing of fables, or invented stories, he says “fables are suitable for public speaking, and they have this advantage, that while it is difficult to find [real examples] it is easier to invent fables” (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.20.7-8). Moreover, he goes on to explain that fables only work when the audience is capable of grasping the metaphorical relationship between an invented story and current events. In any case, he concludes, examples directly related to the case are more appropriate because the ability to understand analogies is gained through the study of philosophy and audiences may not always be able to understand them.

Thus, in answering the questions that we set out to consider in the first part of this paper, we may derive a number of conclusions from our brief foray into Aristotle’s *Art of Rhetoric*. First, Aristotle prefers a deductive style of reasoning that places arguments first and supporting examples second. Although this is what he prefers, he acknowledges that the form taken by the speech may need to vary depending on its intent, the context and the nature of the audience. Second, Aristotle acknowledges that examples that are related to the subject of the speech by metaphor or analogy are occasionally useful, but he regards examples that are directly related as being more persuasive. Arguments should also be directly related to the context of the speech, established by whatever prompt the speaker has, and should not follow a chain of logic that requires the close attention of the audience member.

Aristotle and Impromptu

Aristotle’s approach clearly intersects in a variety of interesting ways with traditional approaches to impromptu speech structure and the kinds of examples students are encouraged to use. Before continuing, I must admit that in critiquing current practice, I proceed on the assumption that the goal of impromptu as an event (indeed forensics as an educational practice) is to prepare students for real-world speaking experiences by teaching them rhetorical skills which they can use in multiple situations (Bartanen 1981). As Compton (2005) acknowledges: “the primary goal of a competitor when encountering a quotation is not to assimilate or learn the information” but to hastily prepare a speech for delivery (p. 3). That is, the goals of many students may not be to gain skills but to take first place. While winning and learning are not mutually exclusive, in my view, the acquisition of skills relevant to real world speaking should be the main goal of coaching and competing. Thus, I generate two main conclusions for impromptu speaking based on Aristotle’s theory of proof.

First, as I have noted before, the arrangement of the traditional approach to impromptu speeches is essentially deductive, placing arguments first and examples second. Essentially, there should be no conflict between this style of inventing arguments and the metaphorical style of generating examples. But many students, in their interpretation of the quotation, broaden it beyond the original concretes it employed and then generate arguments that support their interpretation rather than validating the contention of the quotation. Turnipseed (2005) encourages this approach to impromptu, arguing: “an impromptu speaker must take a quotation and broaden the meaning of the quotation in order to give themselves more latitude of examples” (p. 42). An example of this is as follows. The quotation “They who drink nothing but water, will never make good poets” might be interpreted to mean that only adventurous people can communicate effectively (Horace, trans. 1712, I.19.2-4). Then, the student might generate two arguments that substantiate this point by saying that “outgoing people enjoy socializing more” and that “you have to get out of your comfort zone to effectively communicate.” Examples that could substantiate either of these points could range from well-known extroverted communicators, e.g., Bill Clinton and Margaret Thatcher, to theories that talk about the goals of people who identify as extroverted or introverted, etc. The broadening first happens at the interpretation stage where poems elide into the broader category of communication and water drinkers become unadventurous people (where adventurous people drink wine). Then, from there, arguments are generated that substantiate the interpretation but ignore the concretes inherent in the quotation (i.e., poetry and drink). The speech becomes about extroverts, introverts and communication effectiveness that are relevant to the poetry, but only indirectly by means of metaphor. Poetry and the role of wine in Roman culture which are the concretes suggested by the quotation are disregarded. The effect of this approach is that the judge is required to “draw inferences” or “do other work to discern the relationship” (p. 140) between the quotation and interpretation, work which Harris (1986) found judges do not wish to perform.

Although some might identify this approach as simply a misinterpretation of the quotation, I regard it as a product of using a deductive structure of organizing a speech, while generating examples and arguments based on analogies and metaphors. If one realizes that somehow poems and communication are related and constructs a comparison between them at the early stage of interpretation, one can pull in examples from a broader range of sources. The effect of this kind of broadening is that as the speech unfolds, it becomes less and less about the original prompt and more and more general and vague, in the same way that Aristotle argue that fables work (Aristotle, trans. 1926, II.20.8). In earlier eras, when most students were familiar with the same texts (Caesar’s *Gallic Wars*, for instance) and the same cultural references, it might have been possible to avoid this problem by pulling quotations from sources with which all students would be