

[unclear]. But, as the Secretary says here, there was unanimity among all the commanders involving the Joint Chiefs that, in our judgment, it would be a mistake to take this very narrow, selective target ... . Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, get all the photography we need, the next 2 or 3 days, no, no hurry in our book. Then look at the target system. If it really threatens the United States, then take it right out in one hard crack. (May & Zelikow, 84-85)

Taylor added that the Chiefs "feel so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strike that they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take the limited strike. They feel that it's opening up the United States to attacks which they can't prevent, if we don't take advantage of ... ." But Kennedy interrupted:

Yeah. But I think the only thing is, the chance of it becoming a much broader struggle are increased as you step up the ... . Talk about dangers to the United States, once you get into beginning to shoot up those airports. Then you get a lot of antiaircraft. And you get a lot of ... I mean, you're running a much more major operation, therefore the dangers of the worldwide effects are substantial to the United States, are increased.

Kennedy then warned Taylor: "Let's not let the Chiefs knock us out on this one, General, because I think that [what] we've got to be thinking about is: If you go into Cuba in the way we're talking about, and taking all the planes and all the rest, then you really haven't got much of an argument against invading it." (May & Zelikow, 97)

When Kennedy said "us" to a rhetorically sensitive debater, Taylor immediately altered his position:

**Taylor:** Well, I would be personally ... Mr. President, my inclination is all against the invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.

**President Kennedy:** But you're not for the invasion?

**Taylor:** I would not be, at this moment. No sir. (May & Zelikow, 98)

Although "at the moment" allowed reconsidering what he "personally" favored, "all against" invasion revealed instantaneously siding now with Kennedy rather than the JCS. For the remainder of the meeting, Taylor rarely spoke.

While Excom deliberated air strikes, Robert Kennedy passed the President a note stating, "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor."<sup>25</sup> Even if he did not notice that note, Taylor became aware of it during the later meeting that day, when Under-Secretary of State George Ball argued similarly: "a Pearl Harbor, just frightens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond." (May & Zelikow, 115) Indeed, for the 18 October meeting, Ball circulated a memo about the issue:



We tried the Japanese as war criminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor ... Far from establishing our moral strength ... [it] would, in fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our traditions, by pursuing a course of action that would cut directly athwart everything we have stood for during our national history, and condemn us as hypocrites in the opinion of the world. (May & Zelikow, 121-22)

If hearing impairment caused oral arguments about "Pearl Harbor" to be misunderstood, Taylor now read of its evidential import.

On 18 October, new intelligence photos revealed IRBM [Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile] in addition to MRBM [Medium Range Ballistic Missile] sites. With a range of 2,200 miles instead of 1,100 and warheads with twice the yield, IRBMs could hit all of the United States except the far Pacific Northwest. Upon learning this in the Pentagon that morning, Taylor told the JCS he supported invasion. He did so, however, *before* attending the 18 October Excom meeting, during which he rarely spoke but listened as Robert Kennedy characterized a "Pearl Harbor" attack as "a hell of a burden to carry" and George Ball lamented "carrying the mark of Cain on your brow for the rest of your life." (May & Zelikow, 149, 177-78, 180). At stake now was an unsavory image in history of those who advocated such an attack.

On 19 October, Kennedy invited the JCS to the White House and asked, "What is our response?" LeMay was emphatic: "we don't have any choice except direct military action." Anderson agreed: "the course of action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view is the right one." Wheeler concurred: "from a military point of view, the lowest risk course of action it would take in protecting the people of the United States against a possible strike on us is to go ahead with a surprise air strike, the blockade, and an invasion." Although *not* an advocate of invading Cuba, Shoup indicated how the operation, if ordered, would achieve success: "it's going to take some forces, sizable forces to do it. ... And as we wait and wait and wait, then it will take greater forces to do it. ... if we want to eliminate this threat that is now closer ... we're going to have to go in there and do it as a full-time job." (May & Zelikow, 181-82)<sup>26</sup>

Kennedy was skeptical: "They can't let us just take out, after all their statements, take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and not do anything." LeMay retorted, "Well, history has been, think the other way, Mr. President. Where we have taken a strong stand they have backed off." For JCS ears, Taylor added, "I would agree, Mr. President. I think from the point of view of face that they'll do something. But I think it will be considerably less, depending on the posture we show here." So Kennedy asked LeMay, "How effective is an air strike at this point, General, against the missile bases?" LeMay was categorical: "I think it would be a guaranteed hitting." He thereby contradicted Taylor's previous reservation, "you're never sure of ...



getting everything." While leaving the meeting, Kennedy expressed disappointment: "I appreciate your views. These are unsatisfactory alternatives." (May & Zelikow, 179, 186) The president was leaning toward a naval blockade or "quarantine" that resonated with Barbara Tuchman's book about "miscalculations" causing World War I, *The Guns of August*.<sup>27</sup>

Writing autobiographically, Taylor remembered that Kennedy "often quoted" Tuchman's book.<sup>28</sup> On 26 October, the President told his brother Robert, Ted Sorensen, and Kenny O'Donnell that "miscalculations of the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians, the French, and the British" caused World War I. Thus, for the Cuban Missile Crisis, "the great danger and risk in all of this is a miscalculation—a mistake in judgment."<sup>29</sup> Tuchman had been explicit: blockades minimized risk. The British naval blockade of Germany in 1914 alienated Americans who favored strict neutrality and freedom of the seas. Therefore, Sir Edward Grey's "instinctive English dislike of absolutes" made him "careful" to avoid requiring "either side to take a position from which it could not climb down"<sup>30</sup> Or, as Kennedy paraphrased Tuchman, "I am not going to follow a course which will allow anyone to write a comparable book about this time, *The Missiles of October*. ... If anybody is around to write after this, they are going to understand that we made every effort to find peace and every effort to give our adversary room to move."<sup>31</sup> During the 20 October Excom meeting, Robert Kennedy reiterated "the advantage" of a blockade because "we would get away from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route." After the President concluded "that a U.S. air strike would lead to a major Soviet response," Taylor returned to the Pentagon JCS, and portrayed himself as their spokesperson: "This was not one of *our* better days." (May & Zelikow, 196, 203, *italics mine*)

#### IV.

On Sunday, 21 October, to resolve differing claims about effectiveness of air strikes, Kennedy called in Air Force General Walter Sweeney, whose Tactical Air Command planes would conduct them. Held in the Executive Mansion, this session was not recorded, but McNamara's notes from the meeting are revealing. Although Sweeney said air strikes would be "successful," he added that all the known missiles would not be destroyed because they likely constituted only 60% of those on the island—in contrast to Taylor's assertion that "the best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles." (May & Zelikow, 206). "Missiles" to which both men referred were of two types: "mobile" or "movable." Although Taylor understood how they differed, his hearing impairment might cause misperception. During that earlier White House meeting with the JCS, Taylor had to ask Kennedy, "this is the mobile missiles you're referring to now?" (May & Zelikow, 185) Possible misperception also is suggested by Taylor's voice on Excom audiotapes, characterized by May and Zelikow as a tendency "to fumble for words." (May & Zelikow, 42)

Operating from *mobile* ground-support equipment, Russian MRBMs



were easily transportable by truck for quick set-up and launching from different sites—or hiding elsewhere. Bigger IRBMs needed “fixed,” concrete launch sites and thus were *movable* only for transportation to other such sites.<sup>32</sup> Air strikes could destroy fixed sites but fewer mobile missiles. Sweeney’s inability to guarantee success impressed Kennedy. On 22 October, the President told Excom, “After talking to General Sweeney ... it looked like we would have all of the difficulties of Pearl Harbor and not have finished the job.” After Sweeney’s opinion leadership, Taylor’s statements thereafter in Excom were few and prefaced with “I’m not sure” or “I don’t know.” (May & Zelikow, 230, 239, 306)

Now believing Pentagon expertise was not represented in Excom, the JCS—*minus* Taylor—drafted and sent a letter directly to the President, advocating air strikes on 27 or 28 October and continuing preparations to invade Cuba if necessary. When the JCS went over his head, Taylor distanced himself further from them, as revealed during this 27 October interchange about the Chiefs’ letter to Kennedy:

**Robert Kennedy:** Well, that was a surprise. [Laughter]

**President Kennedy:** Well, that’s the next place to go. But let’s get this letter [to Khrushchev]—

**Taylor:** Monday morning and the invasion are just something to think about. It does look now, from a military point of view ...

**President Kennedy:** What are the reasons why?

**Robert Kennedy:** Can you find out about that?

**Taylor:** They just feel that the longer we wait now ...

**President Kennedy:** But there’s no ... ?

**Taylor:** Right.

**President Kennedy:** OK.

Robert Kennedy’s irony about “surprise,” which elicited Excom laughter, suggests Excom expected unreasonable JCS bellicosity. So when both Kennedys asked what inspired the JCS recommendation, Taylor began, “*They* [italics mine] just feel ... .” Because the letter was written without him, Taylor accurately said “they” instead of “we.” Nevertheless, changing from “we” to “they” underscored estrangement from the JCS. When the president began “But there’s no,” Taylor’s abrupt interruption, “Right,” precluded further Pentagon perspective. And when McNamara indicated he might ask “Ros [Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Walt W. Rostow] to talk to Curt LeMay,” Taylor abruptly interrupted again: “No, I wouldn’t.” (May & Zelikow, 538, 565, 565) By 29 October, however, Excom was euphoric about an Irenic outcome: “quarantine” by U.S. Navy warships worked; Soviet cargo vessels carrying missiles to Cuba turned around; no martial action occurred. And Taylor’s potential for later opinion leadership survived.



When Lyndon Johnson became President after Kennedy's assassination, increasing American involvement in Vietnam required a new ambassador to Saigon. Johnson's first choice in 1964 "for the most dangerous job in the government" was Taylor, who had remained JCS Chairman. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy opposed the appointment because Taylor "is physically weary" and "he's got—I don't know whether it's a bum ticker ... he's had a warning." But Johnson lauded Taylor's "great stature."

I just have the feeling that the people of this country have more confidence in Taylor out there than any man that's going to be available to us that I've heard of. ... The way I feel about Taylor is this. I believe, from what I've seen in the seven months I've been in here, that the most challenging and most dangerous military problem we have is out there. He's our top military man. He's respected in the world and here at home. I'm not sure that the administration has as much respect on Vietnam as Taylor would have on Vietnam. I believe anything in his name, signed to, would carry some weight with nearly anyone.<sup>33</sup>

If Taylor's purpose in 1962 indeed was stature with Kennedy *and* afterwards, his rhetorical sensitivity succeeded.

## V.

Taylor's debating *either* side of an issue remained his forte. For years after the missile crisis, Taylor demonstrated this prowess by changing his position about Cuba as occasions differed. In 1965, Sorensen had deemed military action against Cuba "a Pearl Harbor in reverse, and it would blacken the name of the United States in the pages of history."<sup>34</sup> Some of those "pages of history" were written in 1987 at the Hawk's Cay Conference of scholars and surviving Excom members, including Taylor. Addressing "the most dangerous crisis in history," conferees reexamined deliberations "on the brink" of nuclear disaster. Concluding that Russian missiles in Cuba were more a political ploy than a martial threat, conferees deplored military solutions to diplomatic problems. For historians' ears at Hawk's Cay, Taylor was categorical: "invading the island was the last thing I thought we should do." McNamara concurred for "the pages of history." Earlier in 1962, when Kennedy invited the JCS to the White House to thank them after the crisis, LeMay said after leaving, "We lost! We ought to just go in there today and knock 'em off!" That bellicosity inspired McNamara's remarks in 1987: "I'm just glad that not all the Chiefs were in the Excom" whereas Taylor (for historians' ears) was "one of the wisest, most intelligent military men ever to serve" and withstood "tremendous political and military pressures to *do* something ... a *dove*" with "complete control of the military."<sup>35</sup> At Hawk's Cay in 1987 Taylor was as dovish as he was when not refuting the "Pearl Harbor" analogy in 1962.

Writing his book to be published in 1972, Taylor deftly debated the *other* side of the issue! With American troops warring in Vietnam and



not seeming to win, the former general was "hawkish" about an intransigent Castro and Cuba remaining Communist, for he now refuted the validity of the Pearl Harbor analogy:

Bob Kennedy's Pearl Harbor argument did not carry much weight with me since President Kennedy in the preceding weeks had explicitly warned the Soviets and Castro of the dire consequences of undertaking to establish an offensive military base in Cuba. If we wished to be impeccably scrupulous, it would be possible, I thought, to give Khrushchev and Castro some limited warning, provided it was not long enough in advance to allow the missiles to hide.

Moreover, as if to justify in 1972 what *should* have been done to "get rid of Castro once and for all," he portrayed himself as "a twofold hawk from start to finish, first as the spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then from personal conviction."<sup>36</sup>

## VI.

As one assessment of the Excom deliberations concludes, "*during crises, spokesmen with unpopular ideas are often excluded from the group making the important decisions.*"<sup>37</sup> In those deliberations, General Taylor may have utilized a rhetoric of "personality" to retain his stature as opinion leader. Crises, however, require only complete candor and clarity when communicating relevant information upon which Presidents are dependent. The lesson learned from advocacy in Excom is clear: during deliberations that may lead to martial endeavors, Pentagon expertise and recommendations—even if ultimately ignored—must remain unadulterated by "personality" needs. In these crucial debates, such advocacy is an aberration of rhetorical sensitivity acquired from forensics experience.

## Endnotes

1. *Robert Kennedy In His Own Words: The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years*, ed. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman (New York: Bantam Books, 1988): 11-12.
2. Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959): xiii xiv.
3. Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972): 23.
4. Roderick Hart and Don Burks, "Rhetorical Sensitivity and Social Interaction," *Speech Monographs* 39 (June 1979): 75-91.
5. *Reminiscences of Admiral Robert L. Dennison*, Oral History #87 (Annapolis MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1975), 330-33, 335, 354, 369, 395.
6. See Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965): 305 and 309 as well as Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993): 103, 182-83, 305-7, 363, and 378-9. Earlier in 1962, after reading *Seven Days in May*, a novel about an attempted military coup (led by a bellicose Air Force general who was JCS Chairman), Kennedy confided to Red Fay, "It's possible. ... If the country had a young President, and he had a Bay of Pigs, there would be a certain uneasiness. Maybe the military would do a little criticizing behind his back. Then if there were another Bay of Pigs, the reaction of the country would be 'Is he too young



and inexperienced?" The military would almost feel that it was their patriotic obligation to stand ready to preserve the integrity of the nation and only God know just what segment of Democracy they would be defending."

7. Robert Kennedy, 12-13, 254-55.

8. Reeves, 103, 305-07.

9. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), *Oral History Reminiscences*, Volume II (Annapolis MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1983): 493-95.

10. For several Excom meetings, other participants were invited in, such as United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Taylor was told to wear civilian clothing to avoid the appearance of emergency meetings.

11. Anderson, 541. Brackets mine.

12. Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971): 260-261; 178-179.

13. Lt. Colonel Charles P. Neimeyer, USMC (Ret.), "Critic-Response to Papers about 'Words on Behalf of War: Rhetorical Factors in Deliberations About Military Courses of Action'," National Communication Association Convention, New York City, 1998. Col. Neimeyer is Professor of National Security Decision-Making, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI.

14. In addition to works cited directly herein, see also for instance, Dino A. Brugoni, *Eyeball to Eyeball* (New York: Random House, 1990; Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds. *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: New Press, 1992); David Detzer, *The Brink* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1987); General Anatoli I. Gribkov and General William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: US and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago IL: Edition Q, 1994); and Richard LeBow, *Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

15. Phillip K. Tompkins, "The Rhetorical Criticism of Non-Oratorical Works," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 55 (December 1969): 432, 438.

16. Samuel L. Becker, "Rhetorical Studies for the Contemporary World," in *The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental Project*, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971): 33-35.

17. See Joseph Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communication* (New York: Free Press, 1960): 34-36, 51; Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (1957): 63, 77; Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communication* (Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1955): 286; and Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964): 550.

18. Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969): 33ff.

19. In Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia: Lippincott Company, 1966): 58 and n108 (p. 321).

20. I use the transcripts published by Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), hereafter cited in the text as MZ, followed by page numbers.

21. H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997): 22 and 336, n10. McMaster's assessment is based on his examination of "General Taylor's Speeches," Box 20, File T-415-69, Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, Special Collections Branch, National Defense University Library, Washington DC.



22. General David M. Shoup, USMC (Ret.), *Oral History Interview with Joseph E. O'Connor, 7 April 1967*, 11, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston MA.
23. Anderson, 549 and 565.
24. Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1995): 44.
25. Robert Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 31.
26. With LeMay after Kennedy left the room, Shoup was more "salty": "Somebody's got to keep them from doing the goddamn thing piecemeal. That's our problem. ... You're screwed, screwed, screwed. Some goddamned thing, some way, that they either do the son of a bitch and do it right ... . Once you do it you can't fuck around. ... You can't fiddle with SAM [surface-to-air, defensive weapons] sites. You got to go in and take out the goddamn thing that's going to stop you from doing your job." MZ, 188.
27. For discussion of Tuchman's own rhetorical inclinations (as revealed in her correspondence with her editor) as well as the impress of that book upon Kennedy during the missile crisis, see Ronald H. Carpenter, *History as Rhetoric: Style, Narrative, and Persuasion* (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995): 223-260.
28. Taylor, *Swords Into Plowshares*, 205.
29. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 127 and 62.
30. Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962): 334-36.
31. Kenneth O'Donnell, with David Powers and Joe McCarthy, *Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972): 330-31.
32. Allison, 104ff. See also 124.
33. *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1965-1964*, ed. Michael R. Beschlos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997): 407-409.
34. Sorensen, 684.
35. In James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On The Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989): Chapter One, generally, and specifically pp. 51, 63, 71, and 78.
36. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, 268-69.
37. Dan Caldwell, "The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management," N-2943-CC, Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior (March 1989):





# Debating About Debate: A Symbolic Convergence Theory Meta-Analysis of Educational Reform Movements in Intercollegiate Competitive Debate

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**Abstract:** *In order to assess the success and evolution of numerous debate movements, this article looks at Symbolic Convergence Theory (SCT) as an approach to these movements, explains the development of the rhetorical communities that not only developed each movement, but which also developed within each movement as they evolved. It explains the implications of these conclusions upon the future directions in formal debate communities. This article will limit itself to the history of three movements developed to reform academic debate: 1) CEDA; 2) NEDA; and 3) NPDA.*

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From the beginning of classical antiquity to today, a meta-debate has raged over a key practical issue in formal argumentative discourse: Given the finite human resource of time, how can a debate occur using a format whereby each side of a controversy has a fair chance to present its case (Fisher, 1987; Johnstone, 2002)? Clearly, critics expect advocates to back claims with a quantity of quality evidence. Such evidence must go beyond a reasonable doubt for some cases, or constitute a preponderance of evidence for others. The advocate who best accomplishes one of these means he or she should win his or her case. Given the limiting factor of time as an equalizer, however, the side that presents the most evidence – or takes time to explain an argument that makes sense only if intricate details and contexts are explained – will increase the rate of delivery in order to present the case thoroughly. This, when juxtaposed with the notion that an unaddressed issue equals an issue lost, may lead to a very high detail of argumentation and a rapid rate of delivery from the advocates. This may render the arguments incomprehensible to an audience (such as a jury) who is encountering the arguments for the first time. Given limited time constraints designed to provide equal time for both sides to present a case in an adversarial procedure such as a

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debate, the advocate has to balance the need to address complex issues fully with the need to frame the issues in a way that makes sense to an audience. He or she has to do this balancing act very carefully, lest one's importance outweigh the other's importance.

A controversy has also existed for centuries over how arguments should be adjudicated. In some cases, institutions have developed whereby the arguments are to be evaluated by experts. Such cases include, among other things, the appellate court systems that exist throughout the world, as well as some societies where expert three-judge panels and similar institutions make legal decisions. Also, legislatures as well as certain rulers have had to hear expert arguments over what should be done, and then make decisions. Experts have been both educated and designated to make decisions in the areas of their specialties. An understanding of intricate arguments that reflect the technical specialties of the decision makers proves essential for success in these specialized arenas that have affected and continue to affect our day-to-day lives. A knowledge of technical language and jargon is essential for convincing audiences, such as hospital boards, judges, sometimes legislators, and industrial leaders, about controversial issues affecting our lives.

At the same time, even in an authoritarian situation, leaders cannot remain leaders without the consent of the people – whether that consent be obtained through the ballot box, or whether, as Chinese Premier Mao Zedong once put it, “at the barrel of a gun” – or, perhaps better put, at a number of gun barrels wielded by the rank and file citizenry. In order to be persuasive with the public, an advocate must be able to stress terms that are at once comprehensible and inspirational in the broader public arena. Ideas must be explained, but explained artistically and succinctly, and must somehow both make sense and relate to the day-to-day experiences of those participating in this arena. This notion is dramatized by the character Willie Stark in the famous classic film *All the King's Men*. Early in the movie, the lead character, modeled loosely after Huey Long, did not gain very much attention at first from voters as he presented speeches heavily laden with the intricate details as to why a Stark administration would work better. When he began to eschew detailed argumentation for a style of delivery to which the public arena as portrayed in the movie could relate, however, he *learned how to win*. Although corporate contributions were perhaps more the point of the movie than oratorical skills, it does dramatize that although specialized and technical discourse works in some areas that affect our lives, so does non-specialized discourse which works more in the public arena. Once Willie Stark learned this secret, he nearly pulled out one election, and won the next. The rest is Hollywood political history.

The juxtaposition of how to deal with practical time constraints with issues concerning the degree of specialization within argumentation raises profound questions to argumentation educators in both competitive events and classrooms, and, as is predictable and desir-