consequences are evidence of laws in need of revision.

While we doubt that constitutional procedures fully meeting the needs of the legal formalist could be articulated in any context, Bylaw 15 will not satisfy formalism's requirements, as a few examples will illustrate. Initially, while Article VIII of the CEDA constitution indicates that *Robert's Rules of Order* is the "parliamentary authority for the organization," Article VIII is specifically devoted to describing the business meetings of CEDA. Bylaw 15 does not indicate if or how the provisions of the bylaw interact with those of *Robert's Rules*. While the language of Article VIII appears to be absolute, one might argue the placement of the *Robert's* provision is intended to limit references to *Robert's* to questions relevant to the conduct of business meetings. So, there already is some doubt about what rules and procedures are germane to the conduct of the Professional Review Board, and some interpretive effort would be required to resolve a dispute on this issue.

Another example of required interpretive effort comes from Bylaw 15's Section 5, specifically 5.A.1.e and 5.A.1.f, which suggests the Professional Review Board will or will not find that professional misconduct has occurred. At no point, however, does the language of the bylaw suggest what burden of proof should be set for adjudicating such complaints. Will the burden of proof rest with the complainant? With the person against whom the complaint is lodged? Will the Review Board use a preponderance of the evidence standard in making its decisions? The constitution is silent on this basic issue of judgment. An additional problem for these same clauses is the suggestion that the Review Board has jurisdiction for any violation of CEDA's bylaws, yet the Committee on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment (CDSH), as described in Bylaw 16, expressly is given jurisdiction for sexual harassment complaints. As currently written, CEDA's constitution allows both the Review Board and the CDSH to review such complaints, complete with the worrisome possibility that the separate review processes would reach different conclusions.

A further example of necessary interpretive work is found in the description of sanctions, in which complete discretion on the imposition of sanctions is left to the organization's president, though subject to appeal. While a list of the "most likely" sanctions is provided at Section 5.A.1.h, including "removal from further participation at any CEDA sanctioned tournament," this list is not binding on the president, who has the discretion to impose any sanction, of any sort, with the understanding that the party accused of unprofessional conduct could choose to walk away from the organization instead of meeting the terms of the sanction. There might be many good and practical reasons for giving the president this discretion, but such authority requires considerable interpretive work; it is not consistent with the predictable and consistent outcomes preferred by legal formalists. To use an analogy from the criminal courts, the CEDA president lacks even rudimentary "sentencing guidelines" in the imposition of sanctions.

Our final example of interpretive space in Bylaw 15 concerns the definition of unprofessional conduct. In the preamble to Bylaw 15, the constitution suggests that "behaviors by any tournament participants occurring at Association supported, sanctioned or sponsored events that violate this standard of a healthy education environment should be recognized as `Unprofessional Conduct'." Unfortunately, the health metaphor used in this sentence is not found elsewhere in the preamble, leaving the reader to discern what elements of the preceding four sentences together make up the healthy environment standard (e.g., "behaviors which belittle, degrade, demean, or otherwise dehumanize others are not in the best interest of the activity" and "CEDA participants should also adhere to the CEDA Constitution, CEDA By-laws, and local, state and federal laws"). Further, in Section 5, which describes the Review Board, the healthy environment standard is not mentioned. Instead, the only announced standard concerns violation of "CEDA By-laws identified behaviors."

So, read broadly, any inconsistency with principles articulated anywhere in the constitution could be understood and treated as unprofessional conduct, as could violation of any local, state, or federal law, however minor. If CEDA's Review Board intends to adopt such a broad reading—no violation of law or constitution will be too minor to evade a judgment of professional misconduct—then the needs of the legal formalist will be met. Any Review Board exercise of discretion in such cases, however, will require serious interpretive work, as no such discretion is expressly allowed (or forbidden) by Bylaw 15. The Review Board either must describe any violation of constitution or law as unprofessional conduct, or the Board must invent a scheme for differentiating unprofessional conduct from conduct that is undesirable but not unprofessional.

In this final example, we do not intend to suggest that a member of the CEDA community *should* be branded with a scarlet "U" for unprofessional conduct and banned from debate tournaments following receipt of a parking ticket. Our point is that *no provision of the constitution prevents such a finding or such a sanction,* no matter how seemingly minor the violation of CEDA's governance document or local legal strictures. Serious interpretive work is required to determine what is and is not unprofessional conduct, as no threshold conditions are specified in the constitution. How much cursing must take place before the conduct is unprofessional? How loudly must voices be raised before the volume itself is unprofessional? How explicit must threats be, and what threats are always unprofessional? What physical contact, if any, is permissible? To consider another old and controversial issue of professional conduct addressed by Bylaw 15 (see Bartanen, 1988; McGee & Simerly, 1991), how many friendly conversations are permitted between a professor and a debater who is considering a transfer to the professor's university? These questions, and many more like them, certainly would be relevant in cases brought before the Review Board, but these questions are not answered by the text of the constitution. The extant literature on

intercollegiate debate suggests such questions eventually will be asked. For example, abusive or indecorous speech in the debate community is not unusual, according to anecdotal reports (see, e.g., Hobbs, Hobbs, Veuleman, & Blinn, 2003). Because civility and the terms usually linked to it (e.g., "decorum," "professional") are "deceptively difficult concept[s] to define" (Darr, 2007, p. 59), a procedure failing to provide such definitions and examples will be quite difficult to implement in practice, when specific speech acts must be assessed and judged.

We could go on to identify further gaps, contradictions, and the like for Bylaw 15 and other relevant passages of CEDA's constitution. The examples we provide already should be sufficient to make our point, which is the constitution currently sets neither a bright line nor boundary conditions for separating professional from unprofessional conduct. Further amendment of the constitution might reduce or eliminate some of the problems we identify, but we have no reason to believe that a perfectly perspicuous bylaw is within the reach of this or any other organization. Minimally, whatever one's larger position regarding the formalist project, the goal of legal formalism as a science removing prudential judgment from the legal process cannot be met by the current CEDA constitution, which creates sufficient space for almost every imaginable outcome of an accusation of unprofessional conduct.

Given the most obvious motivation for amending the CEDA constitution—the very public dispute between two university professors that threatened the credibility of intercollegiate debate, a dispute characterized by many commentators as uncivil and unprofessional—the interpretive space provided by CEDA's constitution is particularly problematic. After all, Meyer (2000) points out that civility as a public virtue is both largely unexplored and frequently taken for granted, while Boyd (2006) describes civility as having the "same nebulous moral quality" often assigned to definitions of pornography (p. 863). When civility receives theoretical attention, that attention often does not provide an account of how civility plays out in "words and deeds" (Darr, 2002, p. 317).

While almost everyone abstractly loves civility and despises demeaning and dehumanizing behavior, calls to embrace civility and reject its antithesis give us little guidance in dealing with the complicated messiness of real-world agonistics, where vigorous, informed, and rigorous disputes about ideas—the liberal ideal of reasoned discourse—exist side-by-side with, for example, dehumanizing personal attacks. This messiness in actually existing talk is further exacerbated when one recognizes the enormous differences between different exemplars of dehumanization:

1. "Don't be a horse's ass."
2. "Don't be a dick."
3. "Get out of my face, you stupid bitch."

4. "Get out of my face, jungle bunny."

We will not bother here to parse the important variations in these four straightforward examples of dehumanizing speech. However, to pretend that every Review Board member would know how to deal with any and all examples of dehumanizing or demeaning discourse when confronted with such, and would deal with these examples in a similar fashion, does a disservice to the complexities of disagreement in pluralistic societies. Simply announcing a plan to penalize certain expansive categories of speech as unprofessional tells us relatively little about the plan's enactment. Informal rules, oddly enough, eventually will be required to enable the use of the always incomplete formal rules articulated in the constitution. These rules, of course, will not be disinterested or value-free, precisely because neither procedure nor formal commitments relieved the Review Board of their need to interpret, to judge. As Shanahan (2004) observes, this process of interpretation necessarily will be "neither neutral nor innocent" (p. 72).

In summary, because of the failure to limit interpretive possibilities, the procedure now described in CEDA's Bylaw 15 gives surprisingly little guidance to the reader and does not meet the needs of an interpretation-free zone of formalist science. Based only on the existence of the current Bylaw 15, no university president or other outsider could predict with any certainty which behaviors would be understood as unprofessional and which would not, absent some understanding of the interpretive practice to be employed by CEDA's leadership. Indeed, we are not certain that community insiders will find useful guidance in the current constitution, which might explain the concern expressed by some CEDA members about the vagueness of the amendment, as mentioned in the minutes of the November 2008 CEDA business meeting ("Minutes," 2008). We are confident only that, as presently written, the CEDA constitution provides some mechanism by which irregular or illegal community behavior, as defined in some future somewhere by some future someone, could be sanctioned. Whether such behavior ever *would* be penalized by CEDA's Review Board is a question we cannot answer, at least for cases not involving popular videos published to the Internet, precisely because of the enormous interpretive discretion available to Review Board members and the CEDA president.

In the next section we consider the interaction between CEDA's constitution and the everyday organizational practice of CEDA.

Culture and Performance

> The great majority of CEDA debaters, coaches, and judges are not looking for direction by going through their file drawers in search of CEDA's Constitution and Bylaws . . . . Instead, they are getting the direction they need by examining the public performances of respected CEDA coaches and judges and competitively successful debaters. . . . Formal communication in documents like a Constitution or mission statement does not normally have a sub-

> stantial impact in an organization like CEDA . . . . The realities of CEDA for its practitioners are not found in the formal communication of CEDA, however much the professionals who crafted those documents might wish to believe otherwise. (McGee & Socha McGee, 2000, p. 18)

A decade ago, McGee and Socha McGee argued that CEDA's day-to-day organizational performance by educators, judges, and students was far more important to organizational life than the text of the CEDA constitution. In the current section, we wish to develop and extend this earlier position in light of the revisions made in 2009 to the constitution's Bylaw 15.

The very public crisis experienced by CEDA in mid-2008 was unprecedented in the history of intercollegiate debate, challenging the educational experience provided by the organization and threatening the elimination of one or more debate programs. Given the extent of this crisis, the decision of the CEDA community to change the organizational constitution is not surprising. Organizational outsiders, including university presidents, could be assured following adoption of the constitutional amendment that CEDA now had the tools required for self-regulation. As one journalist summarized the purpose of the constitutional amendment, these changes "were designed to appease the public" (Williams, 2009).

Whether a change in a rarely read governance document will influence the ordinary realities and choices of the members of the community is far from certain, however. First, as one of the interlocutors in the infamous 2008 dispute noted, he expected the problems resulting from that incident would be handled "internally" through community dialogue, rather than being addressed through national media attention (Williams, 2009). This expectation hardly is surprising. For decades CEDA existed as a large national organization without a Professional Review Board, and community members dealt with one another informally when problems appeared, without a constitutional procedure for addressing those problems. The constitution might occasionally have been evoked to remind community members of their ethical obligations, but sanctions were left to individual universities.

Without ongoing media scrutiny and assuming community members are more cautious in the future when they are aware that camcorders are present, there is little reason to believe that future disputes will not be handled informally in the great majority of cases, as they were in the past. There must be a complaint before the Professional Review Board takes action, and we suspect that complaints will be rare. CEDA is what Meyer (2000, p. 83) calls a "close-knit community," where the desire to preserve community traditions and find cooperative solutions to problems will be particularly strong, despite the community's reliance on passionate disagreement as a pedagogical tool. The community will be reluctant to use formalized procedures for dispute resolution, especially given the everyday irrelevance of the

constitution described by McGee and Socha McGee (2000). The weekly interaction with community members, and the pervasive family metaphor described by Hobbs et al. (2003), will encourage informal attempts to resolve disputes amicably, within the "home." Even after CEDA's civility crisis led to a professor's termination, one debate team from a university unrelated to the crisis made public arguments "mourning" the firing and complaining about CEDA's "abandonment" of the fired professor, confirming both the close-knit nature of the community and the preference for informal processes of dispute regulation (http://opencaselist.wikispaces.com/Wyoming). Again, informal rules will trump formal rules by the frequency of their use and the greater commitment of the community to informality.

This reliance on informal rules for organizing the community hardly is surprising. For decades, organizational scholars have documented, with increasing sophistication, the features of organizational culture. While early studies of culture were limited to their relatively static features, Pacanowksy and O'Donnell-Trujillo (1983) were among those "encouraging an examination of how communication has brought that culture into being" (p. 146). For Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujillo, the focus of such studies "needs to be on the communicative performances of organizations" (p. 146). While the periodic effort to invoke constitutional authority is one such performance, the rare reference to the constitution is all but drowned out by the mundane performance of membership tasks. Put another way, the constitution is featured only infrequently in organizational narratives, while dominant narratives of research, tournament selection, wins and losses, development of new positions, and so on enact CEDA daily, giving the organization meaning and purpose in its everyday realities (see, e.g., Mumby, 1987). The constitution is normatively dominant and functionally irrelevant to these everyday dialogues.

Even today, following the crisis of 2008, we speculate that the great majority of undergraduate students involved with CEDA have never seen (let alone read) a paper or electronic copy of the organizational constitution, nor would even a careful reading of the constitution by these students change their behavior in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances. Our argument in this matter is consistent with the available evidence on organizational culture, whether in communication or other disciplines. For example, in a study of workplace safety, Simard and Marchand (1997) find that published workplace rules are far less important to actual safety practice than are "micro organizational" factors, including group cohesiveness and social relationship variables. Written procedures in this context, even where safety is repeatedly and publicly emphasized, were less important than the unwritten rules, the community norms governing organizational culture. Other empirical studies of rule-following behavior also are consistent with our position (e.g., Tyler, Callahan, & Frost, 2007).

We concede that codes of ethics or codes of conduct for other orga-

nizations are important, are evoked regularly, and in some contexts are hegemonic (Clair & Fox, 2008). For certain membership organizations, references to codes of conduct, if not constitutions, are common reminders of shared commitments. Absent an enormous effort by the CEDA leadership to promote, embrace, and enculturate all community members through a repeated embrace of the code of conduct, no such pattern is likely to emerge in CEDA. We think this particularly likely because the core exhortative content of Bylaw 15 in most respects is reducible to the jejune conclusion that community members should be honest and should be nice, a position unlikely to excite or inspire any CEDA educator, judge, or student.

Conclusion

In a response that by academic standards was rapid, CEDA as an organization changed its constitution in early 2009, creating a new standard for unprofessional conduct and a new mechanism to penalize those community members who do not adhere to that standard. Whatever the serious limitations of the amended Bylaw 15 of the CEDA constitution, there is a new call to professionalism immanent in the constitution. All community members are called to be professional in their dealings with one another and with the world outside their community.

Exhortations to professionalism, as Cheney and Ashcraft (2007) observe, too easily imply that professionalism itself is a transparent idea, a "neutral, self-evident descriptor" (p. 147). The expectation of professionalism in CEDA now extends in a juridical sense both to first-year college students and wizened college professors, requiring adherence to both constitutional imperatives and local, state, and federal laws. Despite the seeming importance of this expectation, the threshold conditions for separating professional from unprofessional conduct remain largely unexplained in CEDA's constitution, with much interpretive work necessary to correct for the always incomplete apparatus of the formal procedures provided in the constitution's Bylaw 15. In addition, and perhaps more fundamentally, the community's own notion of professionalism is found in the everyday experience of the community, in which the constitution is rarely invoked. The amended constitution invents a new category, the CEDA professional, by fixing this phrase in the organizational lexicon. The category, however, is filled up and made consequential because of the disparate (and, potentially, inconsistent) associations attached to professionalism by the lived experience of community members.

For CEDA and, we suspect, many other organizations, insider-citizenship is a function of recurrent experience and interpersonal relationships, not the pull or embrace of a governance document. The proceduralism embedded in the liberal constitution stops far short of ordering predictable outcomes or cultivating a robust model of organizational citizenship. For such outcomes to be achieved, unwritten

rules, whether established through previous interactions or determined at the moment of the dispute, necessarily must supplement the constitutional order. The inscribed first-order proceduralism of the constitution must be augmented, even interpenetrated, by the second-order proceduralism of the unwritten rule. Such rules are required both to interpret the procedures announced in writing and to enable the everyday performance of the organization.

This constitutional amendment in CEDA's case has opened one new option to the community, namely, the option to sanction a community member. Despite the problems specific to this amendment and inherent to all such amendments, it seems likely that, if CEDA is sufficiently long-lived, this procedural scheme, made manageable though the supplemental process described above, will be utilized by CEDA and sanctions imposed. Unless the conduct in question brings public scandal to the organization or explicitly threatens the health and safety of community members, however, we doubt that many community members will risk the approbation that comes from filing the necessary complaint and initiating the formal process, violating the community's unwritten rules by doing so. A new option exists for the regulation of membership behavior, but its likely use, despite or perhaps because of its defects, will be infrequent. CEDA's moment of media scrutiny in 2008 overdetermined a finding of unprofessional conduct because the conduct was so notorious and so intuitively scandalous from the perspective of an uninformed public. Such moments, combining wildly atypical conduct and public notoriety, however, are rare in intercollegiate debate (and most other organizations).

So, the CEDA constitution has now been amended. The insider-citizens of the CEDA community likely have guessed this constitutional change will not do much, to the extent that many members of the community even are aware of the constitutional provisions for sanctioning unprofessional conduct. Undergraduate and graduate students come and go, after all, and memories of 2008 will fade quickly. The same outside observers who offered opinions so freely at the height of CEDA's 2008 civility crisis, including a few university presidents, are unlikely to engage in line-by-line criticism of the amended constitution. CEDA has been saved further challenges to its legitimacy by a reform that will cost the organization nothing and leave its organizational performance unchanged.

At some future time, should an organization like CEDA hope to make awareness and use of a written procedure like Bylaw 15 (or any other constitutional procedure) a central facet of organizational life, very substantial changes in organizational practice would be required. First, the organization could make regular efforts to distribute the constitution in both paper and electronic versions to all members of the community, with exhortations to read the constitution with great care. Members could be required to sign a form acknowledging that they had read the constitution as a condition for organizational mem-

bership. Second, the most crucial procedures contained in the constitution could be reprinted in all important organizational documents (e.g., invitations to CEDA-sanctioned tournaments). Third, mandatory organizational meetings could include education about the relevant procedures, complete with concrete examples to illustrate how those procedures are essential to organizational values. Fourth, though difficult to implement, the organization could revise procedures to include penalties for failure to use those procedures already in place, even for those who only are witnesses to (allegedly) unprofessional behavior. Fifth, the organization could create a roving "police force," with select community members charged to look for nonconforming behavior and sworn to report the behavior to the appropriate organizational authority.

The effectiveness of these five strategies, and any others that might be devised, will be radically dependent on the particular features of the specific organizational culture, and there is no easy or uniform mechanism that would guarantee the success of these efforts across multiple contexts. Even when intended to promote outcomes with which the great majority of community members are in agreement, many community members may perceive such attempts to change organizational performance as heavy-handed and distracting.

Finally, while this case study has emphasized the intercollegiate forensic community, we do not suggest that specific community members have done something wrong or behaved in some particularly problematic way. Indeed, we think the behavior of the CEDA membership, including its leaders, has been or would be typical of many other organizational performances completed under reasonably similar circumstances by other voluntary membership organizations. We suspect that our findings would have been quite similar if another case had been studied. In other words, ours is an investigation in organizational performance, which happened to consider the CEDA civility crisis as a case.

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The Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta 95 (Winter 2010): 21-27.

Back to the Future in Forensics: CEDA vs. Parliamentary Debate

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Abstract: The direction of competitive argumentation continues to be a point of discussion among those associated with the activity. As changes continue in parliamentary debate, new tensions surrounding rules and the use of evidence in parliamentary debate, combined with tensions surrounding style, echo the tensions of years past. This article addresses this history, looks at how questions of policy and judging rubrics intertwine in parliamentary tournaments, and advocates co-existence of the formats.

Struggle in the forensic community is not new. For the last thirty years, this community has wrestled with the direction of the activity. Over half a decade ago, these authors wrote of the emerging tensions between policy and parliamentary debate (Eaves and Cates, 2003). A distinct irony is found in the parallelism between pre-1990's CEDA and the current status of parliamentary debate, especially that of the National Parliamentary Debate Association (NPDA). This article focuses on the parallels of this new tension to old tensions, discusses the seeming co-opting of parliamentary debate and suggests co-habitation of these forms of debate.

According to the CEDA constitution, pre-1990's CEDA focused on value criteria to "ensure the long-term growth and survival of intercollegiate debate activity by promoting a form of debate striking a balance among analysis, delivery, and evidence." Glenda J. Treadway wrote that the organization was founded in 1971 and is open for membership from any community or four-year college or university (http://debate.uvm.edu./cedais.html).

In describing the origins of CEDA and its separation from the National Debate Tournament, Jones wrote (1978):

> Most judges at debate tournaments expect an exercise of reasoned discourse, but often they hear only jargon, unintelligible, except possibly to the debaters participating. Discouragement toward this ... led to the formation of a new debate organization, the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA)... Members of CEDA proposed to eliminate the rapid-fire delivery, heavy reliance upon evidence cards, and squirrel cases associated with NDT... (p. 3)

Jones notes that reactions to this change were "heated.". Objections

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from NDT members included the senselessness of arguing attitudes, the queasiness of win/loss decisions on values, the absence of evidence, and lack of judging criteria. Murphy (1994) discusses the reported discontent of former NDT members and the move to CEDA of those members.

As early as 1983 in the *CEDA Yearbook*, these issues continue to be discussed but with the portent of change. Louden and Austin (1983) mention the necessity of high school training for the successful debater in CEDA. Zeuschner (1983) addressed the tension between should and ought in debate resolutions. The signs were already emerging that CEDA was moving away from its revolutionary stance. Further evidence of these changes is reflected in 1984's discussion between Rowland and Brownlee about the re-approaching of these groups. The discussion continued as reflected in Colbert's (1988) paper on CEDA style.

Stepp wrote by 1989 of the problems of CEDA tournament debating as formed at that time. She advocated the consideration of audience-based debates to teach more effective communication. Schiappa and Keehner (1990) summed up early CEDA as a reformist group to NDT with a focus on increasing communication skills, a blend of topics (value and non-value), more timely topics (two a year), and audience-centered. They offered an admonition to new coaches to be adaptive but understand the roots of the organization. At the time of writing, Schiappa and Keehner also suggested, "Unlike the tournaments of a decade ago, an untrained observer is unlikely to be able to distinguish between many national-circuit CEDA and NDT debates" (p. 80). This is certainly so today with NDT and CEDA sharing the same resolution all year, having a joint topic committee meeting in the summer, and routinely traveling to each other's tournaments throughout the debate season.

By 1992, Sheffield wrote that the dichotomy between policy and non-policy debate was artificial. It should be noted that these terms are used in replacement of value and non-value debate as discussed in Schiappa and Keehner. Sheffield revealed that CEDA judges now accepted "stock issues," previously relegated to policy debate. In summation, Sheffield argued that CEDA was no longer purely value debate.

By 1994, programs began to leave CEDA because of some of the same complaints made about NDT twenty years earlier. Horn (1994) answered the questions surrounding these departures. His research indicated that programs had left because of speed in delivery, use of squirrel cases, and lack of an entry point for new programs. The circle seems to be fully made by 1995 when Stanfield and West presented a paper at the Speech Communication Association national conference entitled "Counterplans: The Evolution of Negative Burdens as CEDA Makes the Transition from Value to Policy Debate."

The irony is clear when one compares Jones (1978) to Horn (1994).